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Justice Russell Brown                                  
Supreme Court of Canada
After last year’s successful inaugural issue of the Canadian Journal of 
Comparative and Contemporary Law (CJCCL) dedicated to “Health Law 
and Human Rights”, I am honoured to provide this brief forward to the 
CJCCL’s second issue, containing papers exploring the theme of “Equity 
in the 21st Century: Problems and Perspectives”. 
As a theme, “equity in the 21st century” is intriguing. At first glance, 
one might suppose that “equity” and “21st century” are as suitably 
juxtaposed as “Thomas Aquinas” and “emoji”. While its origins are 
murky, we know that equity emerged long ago from the administrative 
power of the mediaeval Chancellor, to whom the King had delegated 
the task of hearing pleas from his subjects concerning injustices at the 
common law courts. As most law students also know, the Chancellor, as 
an ecclesiastic, was concerned with conscience (wherein lay the path to 
the immortal soul). It was therefore on the basis of “conscience” that he 
exercised this delegated remedial power by ordering respondents to act 
according to good conscience, notwithstanding their legal rights to do 
otherwise. 
This account — while accurate — risks, however, descending into 
caricature in several respects. First, common law courts were not amoral 
wastelands. Still, their limited forms of action could work injustice. Clear 
rules were preferred over avoiding hardship. John H Baker’s famous 
example of the paid debt that must be paid a second time (owing to 
the debtor’s failure to ensure the debt was cancelled after it was paid the 
first time) illustrates the sort of problem that typically arose.1 Secondly, 
while the Chancellor’s jurisdiction ultimately widened from the “wide 
1. John H Baker, An Introduction to Legal History, 3d (London: 
Butterworths, 1990) at 118.
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but vague”2 powers wielded during the Middle Ages, the Chancellor’s 
conscience-based jurisdiction soon narrowed, as the stream of ad hoc 
decisions were inevitably reduced to rules or principles of equity which, 
by the late 18th century, were as inflexible and prone to working injustice 
as the common law itself. By the mid 20th century, the English Court 
of Appeal could unashamedly proclaim in Re Diplock that it lacked 
jurisdiction to do equity on the mere basis that “we may think that the 
‘justice’ of the present case requires it”.3 
As the latter half of the 20th century showed, however, equity had 
not rolled over and died. As Leonard I Rotman argues in his article on 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of the fusion of law and 
equity, in recent decades equity has brought the positive law “closer 
to the human condition”. Longstanding devices such as resulting and 
constructive trusts, injunctions and estoppel were extended, and the 
action in unjust enrichment (assuming it can truly be understood as 
“equitable”) was pulled from its post-Moses v Macferlan4 obscurity. Courts 
have breathed new life into equity’s concern for the conscientious exercise 
of legal rights in property and under terms of contracts. Concerns for 
“fairness” and “justice” have predominated.
A more muscular equitable doctrine to quell “unfairness” and 
“injustice”, however, raises its own set of concerns, none of which are 
new. Is equity really nothing more than a body of sentimental goo to 
be haphazardly applied when the spirit of fairness and justice moves us? 
Or should the conditions calling for its intervention be stated (if they 
can be stated) precisely and exhaustively? The obvious criticism is that 
a purely “I-know-unconscionability-when-I-see-it” approach is nothing 
more than palm tree justice. Equity would lack intelligibility, clarity and 
predictability in application, thereby implicating basic norms of the rule 
of law.5 Little wonder Professor Donovan Waters used to warn his trust law 
2. Paul Vivian Baker & Peter St John Hevey Langan, Snell’s Equity, 29d 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell,1982) at 8.
3. Re Diplock, [1948] Ch 465 at 481 (CA (Eng)), aff’d sub nom Ministry of 
Health v Simpson, [1951] AC 251 (HL).
4. (1760), 97 ER 676 (KB).
5. Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin Group, 2010) at 37.
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students against distorting the remedial constructive trust’s conscience-
based origins by taking it “too far”. That seems fair. Nobody committed 
to equity’s public repute wants to see a new maxim proclaiming equity 
(or the remedial constructive trust) to be the last refuge of a scoundrel. 
At the same time, there has been no expressed appetite for a return to the 
rigid systematization that made Re Diplock possible.
This tension is never far from the surface in this splendid collection 
of essays. For example, Alastair Hudson maintains that we err by 
treating the organizing principle of “conscience” as an entirely subjective 
phenomenon, as opposed to the product of objectively constituted 
sources of normative behaviours. And, although not directly addressed to 
the subjective-vs.-objective dichotomy, Sarah Worthington’s paper seeks, 
by way of analysis of the proscriptive rules which equity imposes upon 
fiduciaries, to bring principle to determining who is a fiduciary (fellow 
Canadians, please pay attention!6), the obligations they owe, and the 
remedies which flow from a breach. In contrast, Hila Keren, in lamenting 
“the fall of equity”, strikes a more subjective note by celebrating (or, 
more accurately from her standpoint, commemorating) equity’s “non-
economic” priorities of “morality, fairness, justice or equality”. The other 
papers implicitly presume that conscience is either an objective reference 
point, or that — if it has a subjective dimension — such subjectivity need 
not defeat clear thinking and rational rule-making in equity. Richard C 
Nolan’s article demonstrating the importance of inherent jurisdiction to 
the administration of trusts celebrates the innovative judicial extension 
of that jurisdiction, for example, to give directions where the trustee 
is caught between competing groups of holders of notes issued under 
the terms of a trust deed. At the same time, though, he calls for greater 
attention to identifying a theoretical basis for deciding when a court 
can or cannot exercise inherent jurisdiction in this fashion. Mark Gillen 
espouses more radical reform of trust law by providing for enforcement 
of certain non-charitable purposes trusts — not, however, by way of a 
subjective act of judicial discretion, but by way of legislative intervention. 
Nolan and Gillen’s papers are also representative of a distinctly 
6. CA v Critchley (1998), 60 BCLR (3d) 92 (CA) at para 75. 
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pioneering flavour to the collection — not inappropriately, given the 
21th century theme. They are joined in this respect by Irit Samet’s 
consideration of whether the law should abandon caveat emptor to 
permit rescission for unilateral mistakes in contract formation, and 
of whether equity is the appropriate vehicle to effect such a reform; 
Matthew Harding’s deep reflection about discriminatory public trusts, 
whether judges should prefer the threshold of “public benefit” over 
“public interest”, and the place of the value of freedom of disposition 
under each threshold; Kathryn Chan’s argument for reinvigorating the 
Federal Court of Appeal’s equitable jurisdiction over registered charities 
by invoking certain curative principles oriented towards effectuating 
imperfect charitable gifts; Paul Davies’ consideration of whether the rules 
of equitable compensation should follow those available for breach of 
contract, for negligence, or for other torts; and David Wiseman’s account 
for the possibility that equity might prefer a beneficiary-protection 
power over a beneficiary-direction rule in the context of joint bank 
account resulting trusts. And, appropriately enough (given this Journal’s 
dedication to comparative law), Graham Virgo seeks to harmonize 
the Australian and Canadian remedial constructive trust with the 
institutional (substantive) constructive trust in England, while Margaret 
Hall considers the applicability to Canadian law of a recent English 
judicial innovation, rooted in the equitable doctrine of undue influence, 
for disrupting relationships that exploit children and mentally incapable 
adults. At a more general level, Justice Mark Leeming shows why equity 
is especially suited to comparative analysis, comprising themes which are 
familiar to jurists throughout the common law world. 
Breaking new ground can, however, be difficult work, and the results 
are not always universally embraced. Robert Chambers shows how, over 
several decades of debate about liability for knowing receipt of assets 
transferred in breach of trust or fiduciary duty, various accounts for such 
liability have been advanced — from unjust enrichment, to failure to 
perform a duty to restore the misapplied trust property, to Chambers’ 
admirably plain-spoken and persuasive argument that knowing receipt 
is itself a breach of trust. Any resort to “waiver of tort”, once hoped to 
be equity’s elixir for overcoming indeterminate causation in mass tort 
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claims,7 must now account for Craig Jones’ account of its limits. Stephen 
Watterson explores the residual uncertainties in the wake of the House 
of Lords’ decision in Banque Financière de la Cité v Park (Battersea) Ltd,8 
following which English law has had to sort out what it means to say 
that subrogation to extinguished rights (usually held by a disappointed 
unsecured creditor or by a lender whose funds were misappropriated to 
discharge another’s liabilities) is not only a remedy, but one that is also 
equitable and restitutionary. And as Mitchell McInnes’ essay on beneficial 
services in respect of land shows, the implications of expanding the scope 
for equitable relief — in that particular case for relief under proprietary 
estoppel — are often insufficiently examined, both before and after the 
fact. 
Our legal community, howsoever one chooses to define it (Western 
Canadian, Canadian, Anglo-American, common law), owes a debt of 
appreciation to Thompson Rivers University’s Faculty of Law on this 
initiative — the CJCCL, with its worthwhile themes and its first-rate 
content. The essays contained in its second issue deserve wide circulation 
among practicing and academic lawyers and, of course, among judges 
charged with doing equity. As one who has profited from reading them, 
I offer my thanks and congratulations to all concerned and, in particular, 
to the authors and to the CJCCL’s editorial team.
7. Serhan (Estate Trustee) v Johnson & Johnson (2004), 132 ACWS (3d) 221 
(Ont Sup Ct).
8. [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL).

